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Laterza: Unwanted Bodily Intrusion

YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNWANTED
BODILY INTRUSION—UNLESS OF COURSE THERE IS A
COURT ORDER
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Smith1
(decided March 16, 2012)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In our modern society few rights are as fundamental to privacy and human dignity as the right to be free from unwanted bodily intrusion by the government.2 This right is derived from the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides individuals with the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.3 In identical language to that of the Fourth
Amendment, Article 1 Section 12 of the New York State Constitution
similarly affords individuals with protections against unreasonable
search and seizures.4 However, despite the mirrored language, the
New York and federal interpretations of those rights are not identical.
New York courts generally interpret search and seizure protections
under the state constitution more generously than that of its federal
counterparts, and in many ways expand the rights conferred on individuals by the federal courts.5
Neither federal nor state law places an absolute ban on
searches and seizures, but rather each in effect prohibits those searches and seizures that are deemed unreasonable.6 The issue then turns
1
2
3
4
5
6

940 N.Y.S.2d 373 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
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to what is reasonable? The most basic rule in this area is that all
searches and seizures conducted absent a warrant, issued by a neutral
magistrate and based on probable cause, are presumptively unreasonable.7 But this general rule is only the starting point. Engrained in
the extensive body of search and seizure law, at both federal and state
levels, are numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement that may
save an otherwise unlawful search or seizure from amounting to a
constitutional violation.8
The next question is what happens if the government conducts
an unreasonable search or seizure? Although neither the federal nor
the state constitution provides a mechanism for enforcement, the judicially created exclusionary rule may, under conforming circumstances, allow for the suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence at trial.9 The exclusionary rule was created as remedial
measure available to an aggrieved party who suffered a constitutional
violation, but more importantly, exists as a deterrent for unlawful police conduct.10 As the creation of the exclusionary rule was intended
to serve an extrinsic social policy, application of the rule is not automatic and may allow for the introduction of otherwise unconstitutionally obtained evidence where suppression would unreasonably
frustrate the administration of justice.11
In the recent decision of People v. Smith, the New York Appellate Division held that tasing an uncooperative, but otherwise noncombative, suspect in order to obtain a DNA sample was an excessive use of force and therefore an unreasonable search and seizure
under both the federal and state constitutions.12 The court further
held that because the search and seizure was constitutionally unreasonable, the evidence obtained as a direct result of the constitutional
violation, namely the DNA sample, required suppression at trial.13
This case note will explore both federal and New York State
search and seizure jurisprudence, as well as the application of the
prophylactic exclusionary rule. Section I of this article lays out the
factual and procedural background of the Smith case. Section II dis7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
See infra notes, 78-79, 235-36.
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648, 651, 655-56, 659 (1961).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08 (1984).
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78.
Id. at 379.
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cusses the federal search and seizure protections afforded to all persons under the Fourth Amendment and addresses what constitutes a
search and seizure, what is required for a reasonable search and seizure, the warrant requirement, and the categorical exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Section III specifically addresses excessive
force claims and when, under federal law, the use of force rises to the
level of an unreasonable search or seizure. Section IV addresses the
exclusionary rule, when it calls for the suppression of evidence, and
the exceptions to the rule. Section V compares and contrasts New
York search and seizure law, excessive force claims, and the exclusionary rule with federal precedent. Section VI discusses the Smith
decision through the scope of both New York and federal law, and
lastly, Section VII concludes this case note.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF PEOPLE V.
SMITH

In July of 2006, four armed men robbed two separate homes
in Niagara Falls, New York.14 Roughly five months later, two armed
men robbed a gas station also located in the same town.15 Approximately two years after the gas station robbery, the defendant, Ryan
Smith (hereinafter “Smith”), “was convicted of Assault in the third
degree,” a crime completely unrelated to the earlier robberies. 16 As a
result of this conviction, a DNA sample was taken from Smith and
entered into the Combined DNA Index System (hereinafter
“CODIS”).17 Once Smith’s DNA was in the CODIS system, “there
was a ‘hit’ indicating that his DNA matched evidence collected in the
2006 home invasions and the gas station robbery.”18 Thereafter, in
August of 2008, the People filed an order to show cause to compel
Smith to submit to a DNA test in the form of a buccal swab. 19 While
Smith received notice of the People’s order to show cause, he failed
to appear in court on the indicated return date.20 On said return date,
the court granted the People’s request and issued the order compelling Smith “to provide a buccal swab ‘to be taken by or at the direc14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 375.
Id.
Id. at 375-76.
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 375-76.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
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tion of’ ” the Niagara Falls Police Department (hereinafter
“NFPD”).21 Smith complied with the order and allowed the NFPD to
obtain a sample, but by no fault of his own, “the DNA sample was
sent to the incorrect lab and was ‘compromised[,]’ ” requiring the
People to obtain a second order.22 Again, the People requested an order to compel Smith to submit to a buccal swab, only this time the
request was made “by a letter to the court in September 2008.”23 At
no time was Smith notified of the People’s second application for a
duplicate order, nor was he served with a copy of the second order issued by the court.24 Shortly thereafter, the police approached Smith
on the street, handcuffed him and took him to the police station
where officers attempted to take the court ordered sample.25 Smith
was picked up by the police at 6:00 P.M.26 At approximately 6:18
P.M. that same evening, after refusing to submit to the test, the police
tased Smith’s bare skin in order to force his compliance.27
Following a jury trial, Smith was convicted of five counts of
first degree burglary and seven counts of first degree robbery.28
Smith appealed the conviction on the grounds that the county court
improperly denied his pretrial motion to suppress the DNA evidence
and argued that “he lacked notice of the application seeking to compel him to provide a buccal swab and because the police used excessive force to obtain the swab.”29 The New York State Appellate Division found in favor of Smith with respect to both claims.30
21

Id.
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 378.
27
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376, 378. When the police picked up Smith on the evening in
question, he did not resist the police and voluntarily entered the police vehicle “even though
the police did not tell him why he had to accompany them.” Id. at 378. Once at the station,
Smith was “placed in a secure room, where he was handcuffed, seated to the floor, and surrounded by three patrol officers and two detectives.” Id. When the officers tried to take
Smith’s DNA sample, at no time did he “threaten, fight with, or physically resist . . . rather,
he simply refused to open his mouth to allow the officers to obtain a buccal swab.” Id.
28
Id. at 375.
29
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 375. Although not expressly provided for by statute, the New
York Court of Appeals has recognized that a court may issue an order “to compel uncharged
suspects to supply a DNA sample” if certain requirements are satisfied. Id. at 376. In the
present case the court found that all necessary requirements were satisfied and Smith did not
challenge this issue on Appeal. Id.
30
Id. at 375.
22
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Specifically, the court held that Smith’s due process rights were violated when the second order was issued without adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard.31 The court further held that Smith’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated because of the excessive
force used by the police to obtain the sample.32 As a result, the court
reversed the county court’s judgment, granted Smith’s motion to suppress the DNA evidence, and ordered a new trial.33
III.

FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROTECTIONS

The Fourth Amendment affords individuals the right to “be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures [which] shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.”34 This right seeks to protect “the
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their
direction.”35 Accordingly, these protections apply to searches and
seizures by the government or individuals acting as a government
agent, but does not protect against a search or seizure effected by a
purely private party, no matter how arbitrary.36
In order to qualify for Fourth Amendment protections, the
challenged government activity must constitute either a search or seizure within the meaning of the Constitution.37 Absent a finding that
either a search or a seizure was conducted the Fourth Amendment is
inapplicable.38

31
Id. at 377. Although the court found that Smith’s DNA evidence should have been
suppressed on both due process and excessive force grounds, the scope of this article will be
limited to the discussion of Smith’s search and seizure rights and his excessive force claim.
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 379.
34
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35
Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989). Fourth Amendment protections apply only to intrusions by Government actors, or those private parties who
“act as an instrument or agent of the Government.” Id.
36
Id. at 614.
37
Thomas K. Clancy, What Is A "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?,
70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006).
38
Id.
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Search and Seizure Defined

What is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? In its formative years, Fourth Amendment law was narrowly
interpreted based upon the amendment’s literal language, which was
construed as principally protecting individuals’ property interests.39
During those early years, a search literally required a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area, i.e., “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”40 It was not until 1967 with the case of United
States v. Katz,41 one of the most influential cases in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that this physical trespass standard was abandoned and was replaced with a definition based on protecting individuals’ privacy, rather than property interests.42 It was in Katz that
the Court famously established “that the Fourth Amendment protects
people [ ] not simply areas.”43 Interestingly, the groundbreaking impact of the Katz decision did not come from the majority opinion, but
instead the concurring opinion by Justice Harlan.44 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan coined the phrase “a reasonable expectation
of privacy” which provided the basis of the Court’s present definition
of a search.45 As the Court explained in United States v. Jacobsen,46
“[a] ‘search’ occurs whenever an expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”47
In Katz, the Court formulated a two-part test to determine
whether an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy.48 When applying this test, the first inquiry is whether “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of
the challenged search[.]”49 The second being, “is society is willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable[.]”50 Whether an invasion of
39
Michael Campbell, Defining A Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme
Court’s Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 192 (1986).
40
Id.
41
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42
Campbell, supra note 39, at 193.
43
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44
Id. at 360-62.
45
WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 3 (3d ed. 2010).
46
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
47
Id. at 113.
48
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
49
Id.
50
Id. As such, purely subjective expectations of privacy are not recognized as deserving
of Fourth Amendment protection. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
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a person’s privacy is reasonable “must be appraised on the basis of
facts as they existed at the time that the invasion occurred.”51
What an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”;
however, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office,” will not.52 Another relevant consideration is
the manner in which the investigation was conducted. As seen in canine-sniff cases, discriminate but nonintrusive investigative methods,
which reveal only evidence of criminality and arguably no other private information, are not considered searches under the Fourth
Amendment.53 In stark contrast, when it comes to obtaining samples,
the Court has long recognized a forced intrusion into a person’s body
for the purpose of obtaining a blood sample, a urine sample, or a
breath test constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment as each
of these intrusions raise serious concerns about a person’s bodily integrity.54
Unlike the blanket definition of a “search” as applied to both
persons and places, when considering whether a “seizure” occurred
the standards are different for both persons and property. A “ ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”55 Whereas
a “seizure” of a person occurs if “in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave.”56 Claiming “seizure” of a person requires a showing that an officer “by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”57 It
reasonably follows that any restraint exerted on a person for the purpose of conducting a search consequently constitutes a seizure.

51

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
53
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
54
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17.
55
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
56
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). In order to ensure “that the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind of the individual
being approached” this test does not call for consideration of how an individual responded to
the actions of police officers. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988).
57
California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991).
52
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Satisfaction of the Fourth Amendment—What is
Reasonable?

Once it is established that the government effectuated a search
or seizure, the next inquiry is whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As it flows
naturally from the language of the Fourth Amendment, not all
searches and seizures are barred, but rather, only those which are unreasonable.58 To determine if a search or seizure was reasonable,
courts must consider all of the surrounding circumstances, including
the “nature of the search or seizure itself,” and then balance the degree of the intrusion on the individual’s constitutionally protected
rights against the “promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”59
As the Court stated in Katz, “the most basic constitutional rule
in this area [ ] that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few well established and well delineated exceptions.’ ”60 With respect to the issuance of warrants and warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures, the
most basic requirement for Fourth Amendment satisfaction is the existence of probable cause.
By the vey terms of the Fourth Amendment, probable
cause is indispensible to the issuance of a valid warrant. That constitutional sine qua non applies to the
search warrant and arrest warrant alike. The case law,
moreover, has also established probable cause as the
necessary predicate for both a reasonable warrantless
search for evidence and a reasonable warrantless arrest.61
Although there is no mechanical test to apply to determine whether
probable cause existed, the Court in Brinegar v. United States62 articulated a widely accepted definition and stated as follows:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very

58

Skinner, 489 U.S at 619.
Id.
60
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at
357).
61
GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 13.
62
338 U.S. 160 (1949).
59

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/12

8

Laterza: Unwanted Bodily Intrusion

2013]

UNWANTED BODILY INTRUSION

1183

name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. . . . “The substance of all the definitions” of probable cause “is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” And this
“means less than evidence which would justify condemnation” or conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for
the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United
States.63 Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has
come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable
cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within
their (the officers’) knowledge, and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that” an offense has been or is being committed.64
In the early years of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, police
were not required to obtain a warrant whenever feasible, but rather, it
was generally accepted that police merely must “behave reasonably
whenever they search[ed] and whenever they seize[ed], without calibrating too finely just what reasonable behavior involved.”65 It was
not until the “coming of the Warren Court and its so-called ‘Criminal
Law Revolution’ . . . [that the] Court determined [ ] the most effective way to maximize Fourth Amendment protection was, whenever
possible, to interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between
‘the policeman and his quarry.’ ”66 It was at this point that the warrant requirement became an integral part of Fourth Amendment law
requiring police to obtain a warrant whenever feasible.67 In order to
encourage adherence to this warrant requirement, a lesser degree of
probable cause was, and still is required to support a warrant as valid
than any warrantless police activity.68
The warrant requirement provides individuals with two distinct protections. The first is to eliminate searches without probable
63
64
65
66
67
68

11 U.S. 339 (1813).
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-77 (quoting Locke, 11 U.S. at 348) (citation omitted).
GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
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cause.69 This interest is carried out by the issuance of a warrant because it requires a neutral judge or magistrate to make a “careful prior
determination of necessity.”70 Second, where a judge or magistrate
determines that a search or seizure is necessary, the purpose of the
warrant is to then limit the scope of the search or seizure as much as
possible in order to avoid general, unrestricted rummaging through an
individual’s property.71 Discussing the importance of the warrant requirement, the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire72 stated:
[t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of
our constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts
all over this country. It is not an inconvenience to be
somehow weighed against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part
of our machinery of government, operating as a matter
of course to check the well-intentioned but mistakenly
over-zealous, executive officers who are a part of any
system of law enforcement. If it is to be a true guide
to constitutional police action, rather than just a pious
phrase, then [t]he exceptions cannot be enthroned into
the rule.73
In Schmerber v. California,74 the Court addressed the sensitive nature of search and seizure cases involving bodily intrusions
and surgical procedures performed for the purpose of obtaining evidence of criminality.75 In the context of these special cases, the ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements should be considered merely
as threshold requirements.76 In its decision, the Court provided three
additional factors to balance when determining reasonableness: “the
extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the
individual. . . . [T]he extent of intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary interest in personal privacy and bodily integrity. . . . [And]
[w]eighed against these interests is the community’s interest in fairly
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
Id.
Id.
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Id. at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted).
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Id. at 768-70.
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985).
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and accurately determining guilt and innocence.77
C.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

It is a well accepted principle that the warrant requirement is
not an absolute; the controversial question is under what circumstances is dispensing with this requirement justified? Dispensing
with the warrant requirement, as previously stated, is at least in theory, “subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions.”78 These well recognized, or categorical exceptions include: search incident to a lawful arrest; exigent circumstances; the
plain view doctrine; consent; the stop and frisk exception; the automobile exception; the suitcase/container exception; and the traffic
stop exception.79 Courts place the burden on those seeking to invoke
an exception to the traditional warrant requirement to show that under
the circumstances, the exigencies of the situation were imperative.80
With each of these exceptions comes an extensive body of law; however, for the purposes of this case note, only those exceptions relevant to the facts of Smith, the case at hand, will be discussed.81
When considering whether there is an applicable exception to
the warrant requirement justifying the particular search or seizure and
thereby saving it from violating the Fourth Amendment, courts must
ask “what is the predicate for the initial intrusion and [ ] what is the
permitted scope of what may be done under the exception.”82
1.

Search Incident to Lawful Arrest

One recognized exception to the warrant requirement occurs
where there is a search incident to lawful arrest, in which case the
warrantless search “may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the person arrested.”83 Once a lawful arrest is made, based on a showing of the
requisite probable cause, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
77

Id. at 760-62.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
79
GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 16-21.
80
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455.
81
While the opinion in Smith does not specifically address each potentially applicable exception, this case note will discuss each exception relevant to the facts of the case.
82
GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 16.
83
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 456.
78
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subsequently search the arrestee, and further, to seize any weapons or
evidence that may be in the arrestee’s possession.84 However, any
search conducted incident to an arrest must be “substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and it is confined to the immediate vicinity
of the arrest.”85
2.

Exigent or Emergency Circumstances

Another exception to the warrant requirement deals with
searches and seizures incident to exigent or emergency circumstances. Exigent circumstances have been defined as “situations where
‘real[,] immediate and serious consequences’ will ‘certainly occur’ if
a police officer postpones action to obtain a warrant.”86 This exception can be broken down into four sub-categories of exigencies: “hot
pursuit of a fleeing felon[,]”87 preventing the “imminent destruction
of evidence,”88 “the need to prevent a suspect’s escape,” and neutralizing “the risk of danger to the police or to other persons.”89 Under
this exception, absent a finding of probable cause, one of these four
sub-categories of exigent circumstances must exist for a warrantless
search or seizure to be constitutional.90 Of these four subcategories,
preventing the destruction of evidence and protecting police/public
welfare are relevant to the within discussion of Smith.
With respect to preservation of evidence, “[w]here there are
exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now
or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to
permit action without prior judicial evaluation.”91 The Court has recognized the need to preserve evidence of an individual’s bloodalcohol content as a time sensitive issue, constituting an “emergency”
circumstance under Fourth Amendment law.92 However, unlike evidence of blood-alcohol content, the genetic character of DNA evi84

United States. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 456. This area has become known as the Chimel perimeter and
includes “the entire area within the reach, lunge, or grasp of the arrestee.” GREENHALGH,
supra note 45, at 16.
86
United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ewolski v. City
of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002).
87
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
88
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984).
89
Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
90
Id.
91
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973).
92
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71 (1966).
85
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dence is “not subject to change” and therefore by its very nature cannot fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.93
As far as protecting the police and public welfare, the Court in
Warden v. Hayden94 emphasized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does
not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if
to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”95
Accordingly, under this sub-category, justification for a warrantless
search or seizure requires a showing, under the totality of the circumstances, that “law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis
for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or
themselves from serious harm; and [that] the search’s scope and
manner were reasonable to meet the need.”96
3.

Consent

The consent exception is rooted in the principle that an individual may waive any of his constitutional rights, including those
protected under the Fourth Amendment.97 A search authorized by
consent does not require probable cause, and therefore, law enforcement officers frequently seek consent to obtain evidence where there
is some indicia of illegal activity, but where said activity does not rise
to the level required to obtain a warrant.98 When dealing with the issue of consent the key questions are: who gave the consent, specifically did the consenter have, or appear to have, the legal authority to
consent, and how was the consent obtained.99
Under this exception, “a search authorized by consent is
wholly valid . . . [provided] the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”100 While this exception seems simple enough on its
93

Graves v. Beto, 301 F. Supp. 264, 265 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
95
Id. at 298-99.
96
United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010).
97
GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 20.
98
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). “[W]hen . . . the government
relies on consent to justify a warrantless search, it bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary.” United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d
119, 131 (2d Cir. 2006).
99
GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 20.
100
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222. In addition to the requirement that consent be voluntary,
“[t]he individual giving consent must also possess the authority to do so.” United States v.
Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011). Both the individual under investigation or a third
94
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face, difficulties arise in determining voluntariness.101 As Justice
Frankfurter colorfully put it: “[t]he notion of voluntariness is itself an
amphibian.”102 Courts should look at the totality of the circumstances
under which the consent was given to determine if it was in fact voluntarily.103 Relevant considerations, none of which are dispositive as
to the question of voluntariness include: the subjective state of mind
of the consenter, whether the police questioning or practices were
subtly coercive, and whether the consenter had knowledge of his
right to refuse the search.104 Additional considerations include:
whether the consenter was in custody, in handcuffs, if there was force
exerted, whether the individual had previously refused to consent,
and whether the police gained the consent by telling the consenter
that a warrant would be obtained.105
Once given, consent may be withdrawn at any time up and
until the search is complete. “Withdrawal of consent need not be effectuated through particular ‘magic words,’ but an intent to withdraw
consent must be made by [an] unequivocal act or statement.”106
Withdrawing consent requires “an act clearly inconsistent with the
apparent consent to search, an unambiguous statement challenging
the officer’s authority to conduct the search, or some combination of
both.”107 While a search is being carried out based on consent, police
officers do not have the authority to order the consenter not to inter-

party with authority over the property at issue may validly consent to a search or seizure.
United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2007). However, problems arise when
a third party does not have actual authority over the subject property, but at the time of consent appears to the police to have the necessary authority. Id. Accordingly, the question of
who has authority to consent is examined “subjectively through the eyes of the policeman at
the time of the search or seizure.” GREENHALGH, supra note 45, at 20. Therefore, where an
officer subjectively believes that the consenter has authority to consent, this apparent authority may be sufficient to uphold the validity of the consent. Andrus, 483 F.3d at 716-17.
101
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224.
102
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604-05 (1961).
103
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26.
104
Id. at 229. Although the consenter’s knowledge of his right to refuse a search is a relevant factor when determining whether or not consent was voluntary, there is no affirmative
obligation on the part of law enforcement officers to advise an individual of his right to refuse prior to gaining consent. Id. at 231.
105
United States v. Lavan, 10 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
106
United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004).
107
United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005).
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fere with the search.108
IV.

EXCESSIVE FORCE

Individuals alleging excessive use of force by a government
official have two available avenues for relief. The first, is to assert a
civil claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983109 seeking damages under civil liability principles for the wrongdoing of the officer.110 The second
option, during the course of a criminal proceeding, is to seek suppression of the evidence unconstitutionally obtained as a direct result of
the alleged excessive use of force.111
For many years, there was serious debate amongst the federal
circuits over the source of excessive force protections and the standard to apply when analyzing such claims. It was not until 1989 with
Graham v. Connor112 that the Court resolved the debate over the
source of excessive force protections. In Graham, the Court rejected
the views of the majority of federal courts at that time, which were
applying a generic substantive due process test based on the assumption “that there is a generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive force,”
but that the right was not grounded in any particular constitutional
provision.113 Instead, the Court firmly established that courts should
analyze each excessive force claim with respect to the specific constitutionally protected right “allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.”114 Accordingly, when examining an excessive
force claim, courts must first determine which specific constitutionally protected right had allegedly been infringed and “the claim must
then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard
which governs that right, rather than some generalized ‘excessive
force’ standard.”115 Primarily, the constitutional rights of an individual against excessive use of force are found in the Fourth Amend108
Id. During the course of a consent search, courts have recognized such actions as a
consenter locking the trunk to a vehicle during the course of the consented search as an act
unequivocal and unambiguous enough to constitute a withdrawal of consent. Unites States
v. Ibarra, 731 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Wyo. 1990).
109
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
110
United States v. Arista-Herrera, No. 8:05CR301, 2006 WL 680891, at *4 (D. Neb.
Feb. 21, 2006).
111
Id.
112
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
113
Id. at 393.
114
Id. at 393-94.
115
Id. at 394.
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ment right against unreasonable search and seizure, the Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law.116
A.

Classifying the Right

Excessive force claims are classified by reference to the legal
status of the individual asserting the claim.117 From arrest to conviction there are four stages: “(1) the initial investigatory stop and/or arrest; (2) an undefined period between ‘arrest’ and ‘pretrial detention’;
(3) another undefined period referred to as ‘pretrial detention’; and
(4) post-conviction incarceration.”118 While there is little debate that
excessive force claims of a convicted prisoner should be analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment, the classification of the remaining statuses are not always as clear.119 Generally, courts should analyze
claims of excessive force by pretrial detainees or arrestees under substantive due process principles of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, while analyzing the claims of free citizens under the Fourth
Amendment.120
The Court made clear in Graham “that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force–deadly or not–in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . rather than
under a ‘substantive due process approach.’ ”121 The Court reasoned
that “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct”, and therefore, should guide these claims.122 Notably, the Court failed to draw a clear line as to when the course of an
“arrest” ends and when it evolves into “pretrial detention.”123 This
116

Id. at 394-95.
Brandon J. Demyan, Aldini v. Johnson: The Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment—
Which Applies to Excessive Force Suits Prior to Arraignment?, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
433, 433 (2010).
118
H.L. McCormick, Excessive Force Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 URB.
LAW. 69, 69 (1997).
119
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
120
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
H.L. McCormick, supra note 118, at 69.
[T]he arrest, and the potential for Fourth Amendment violations, may
end when the arrestee is handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser. If
117
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gray area, concerning whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment
protections apply, continues to be a common source of disagreement
among federal courts.
B.

The Legal Standards

Once a court determines the legal status of the individual,
thereby classifying the excessive force claim, it must then apply the
corresponding constitutional standard, governing that specific
right.124
1.

Eighth Amendment

The Eight Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause “was designed to protect those convicted of crimes” while
serving time as punishment.125 Accordingly, the Eight Amendment
standard is less protective than that of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments because it applies “only after the State has complied
with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”126 For a sustainable Eighth Amendment claim, an
inmate must show that the physical force used by the prison official
inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain which requires “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”127 Relevant considerations when analyzing Eighth Amendment excessive
force claims are:
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between the need and the amount of force
used, [3] the extent of the injury inflicted, . . . [4] the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates,
as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on
the basis of the facts known to them, and any efforts
that is so, then claims of excessive force while en route to the police station may require Fourteenth Amendment rather than Fourth Amendment
analysis. The different analysis can lead to entirely different results depending on what the [claimant] can prove about the [ ] officer’s state of
mind and the objective reasonableness of the [officer’s] acts.
Id. at 70.
124
Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
125
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
126
Id. at 671 n.40.
127
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
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made to temper the severity of a forceful response.128
Due to the special nature of internal prison security issues, great deference is given to prison administrators with respect to the “adoption
and execution of policies and practices . . . needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”129 It
reasonably follows that application of the Eighth Amendment in excessive force claims requires some consideration of the subjective
state of mind of the officer exerting the force.130
2.

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

As previously mentioned, claims of pretrial detainees and arrestees are properly analyzed under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ due process principles.131 The assessment for Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims requires application of the four-factor test articulated by the Court in Johnson v.
Glick.132 Although Johnson was subsequently overturned by Graham, the four-factor test remains the standard used by courts when
analyzing excessive force claims under the due process clauses. Said
factors are as follows:
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between the need and the amount of force that
was used, [3] the extent of the injury inflicted, and [4]
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.133
Incarcerating an individual charged, but not yet convicted of a crime,
is a permissible government practice used to ensure that person is
present for trial if one should arise.134 However, unlike convicted
prisoners, pretrial detainees are innocent until proven guilty, and
therefore “it is not sufficient that the conditions of confinement for
pretrial detainees merely comport with contemporary standards of

128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 321.
Id. at 321-22.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 395.
481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), overruled by Graham, 490 U.S. 386.
Id. at 1033.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531 (1979).
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decency prescribed by the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eight Amendment.”135 While an individual held in pretrial detention
has, as a prerequisite to his detention, undergone a judicial determination of probable cause justifying the restraint on his liberty, he may
only be subjected to the restrictions and conditions of confinement to
the extent that “those conditions and restrictions do not amount to
punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.”136
Whether in a prison, custodial center, or some other form of a
detention facility, “[o]nce the Government has exercised its conceded
authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to
employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention.”137
Incident to detention is the loss, in varying degrees, of the freedom of
to make personal choices and privacy.138 However, unless the government action taken against a pretrial detainee is construed as punishment, the deprivation of liberty incident to detention does not rise
to the level of a due process violation.139 The mere interference “with
[a] detainee’s understandable desire to live as comfortable as possible
and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not
convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.’ ”140
3.

Fourth Amendment

Excessive force claims by free citizens during the course of an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ are analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard.141 Determining whether the force used was reasonable, calls for a balancing of
the intrusion on the individual’s constitutionally protected Fourth
Amendment interests’ against “the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”142 There is no “precise definition or mechanical application” of the reasonableness test, and as a result, proper application requires consideration of all the surrounding facts and

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 535-37.
Id. at 537.
Id.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-37.
Id. at 537.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
Id. at 396.
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circumstances in every individual case.143 Relevant considerations
include: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”144
When applying the objective reasonableness standard, “[t]he
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.”145 This requires the court to consider the
reasonableness of the use of force at the moment it was applied rather
than in light of subsequent knowledge or information, which would
clearly have rendered the use of force unnecessary. 146 In addition,
“the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments–
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”147
However, the question of reasonableness remains objective in that it
asks “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard
for their underlying intent or motivation.”148 In other words, force effectuated from an officer’s bad intentions will not itself give rise to a
Fourth Amendment violation, nor will an officer’s use of force with
good intentions save it from a constitutional violation.149
Courts have “long recognized that the right to make an arrest
or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”150 “Not
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.”151
When analyzing excessive force claims, courts must not lose sight

143
Id. “The question is not simply whether the force was necessary to accomplish a legitimate police objective; it is whether the force used was reasonable in light of all the relevant
circumstances.” Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
144
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. These three considerations later became known as “the
three Graham factors.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2010).
145
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 396-97.
148
Id. at 397.
149
Id.
150
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
151
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/12

20

Laterza: Unwanted Bodily Intrusion

2013]

UNWANTED BODILY INTRUSION

1195

“of the fact that ‘the integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished
value of our society.’ ”152 In the case of Tracy v. Freshwater,153 the
Second Circuit found an officer’s act of spraying a handcuffed suspect in the face with pepper spray while attempting to effectuate an
arrest was an unreasonable use of force under the Fourth Amendment.154 The use of pepper spray has painful and incapacitating effects, which constitutes a “significant degree of force.”155 Recognizing that the use of pepper spray constitutes a “significant degree of
force,” the court noted “it should not be used lightly or gratuitously
against an arrestee who is complying with police commands or otherwise poses no immediate threat to the arresting officer.”156 Similarly, in Orem v. Rephann,157 the Fourth Circuit held that the use of a
taser gun on a woman being transported in the back seat of a police
car, who was in both hand and foot restraints, was an objectively unreasonable use of force in that the taser gun was neither used to protect the officers, nor used to prevent the woman’s escape.158 On the
other hand, in the Eighth Circuit case of Mckenney v. Harrison,159 the
court held the use of a taser on a misdemeanor suspect was objectively reasonable in order to prevent his escape as the suspect attempted
to flee through a window.160
V.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE: GROUNDS FOR SUPPRESSION

Although the Fourth Amendment does not itself provide a
mechanism for enforcing its rights, it is well settled that “[w]hen law
152

Hammer, 932 F.2d at 846 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772).
623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010).
154
Id. at 98. In Tracy the court was asked to review four separate claims of excessive
force but found only the use of the pepper spray to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 9697. The court found the other displays of force by the officer were reasonable, specifically
when the officer struck the defendant with a flashlight several times, jumped on top of the
defendant when he tried to flee, and when he forcibly moved the defendant to the ground
despite his claims of pain. Id. at 97-98.
155
Id. at 98.
156
Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98.
157
523 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008).
158
Id. at 446, 448-49. While the excessive force claim in Orem falls under the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment because the claimant, though not formally
charged, had already been arrested and was in the process of being transported when she was
tased, it is a noteworthy example because the court held, even under the more stringent due
process standard, that the use of the taser constituted excessive force. Id. at 446.
159
635 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2011).
160
Id. at 360.
153
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enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting an
unreasonable search and seizure, the exclusionary rule may bar the
admission of the evidence obtained directly and indirectly from the
violation.”161 The suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence is not
constitutionally required,162 but rather, the rule exists as a “prophylactic measure created by the judiciary to protect individuals’ Fourth
Amendment rights.”163 It was in 1914, with the case of Weeks v.
United States,164 that the Court first applied the exclusionary rule to
federal prosecutions.165 However, it was not until 1961, forty-six
years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,166 that the Court finally recognized the
need for exclusionary protections at the state level and mandated the
prophylactic rule be applied to the States.167
As the Court discussed in Mapp, the exclusionary rule is intended, first, to serve as a deterrent for lawless police conduct by discouraging officers from violating an individual’s constitutional rights
to obtain evidence; second, to maintain judicial integrity; and third, to
provided a remedial measure for those individuals whose rights were
violated.168 However, due to the extremely diverse nature of encounters between police and citizens, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule is often difficult to properly invoke and therefore does not always carry out its intended functions.169 Despite the practical difficulties in invoking the rule, the Court maintains, where police conduct is “over-bearing or harassing, or [ ] trenches upon personal
security without the objective evidentiary justification which the
161

United States v. Gray, 302 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (S.D.W. Va. 2004).
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. The exclusionary rule applies both to primary evidence seized
as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure as well as to derivative evidence later discovered as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).
163
Gray, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
164
232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
165
Id. at 398.
166
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
167
Id. at 660.
168
Id. at 648, 651, 655-56, 659.
169
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). The Supreme Court recognized “[n]o judicial
opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter” and because of this immeasurable variety of circumstances, the facts of each case must be viewed on a case by case
basis. Id. at 15. On one side of the debate, law enforcement officials argue that there is a
need for flexibility in dealing with potentially dangerous situations that unfold when making
either a stop or an arrest, and anything discovered incident to the stop or arrest should be
admissible. Id. at 10. On the other side, advocates of heightened Fourth Amendment protections argue that specific justification should be required for intrusions on protected personal
security as it goes to the heart of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 11.
162
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Constitution requires . . . it must be condemned by the judiciary and
its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.”170
Although the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule provides
vital safeguards, it is not itself a fundamental right and therefore is
not automatically applied.171 Despite being commonly referred to as
“ ‘the exclusionary rule’ in theory it is best classified as a privilege,
since it keeps out of evidence matter of probative weight in order to
serve an extrinsic social policy.”172 As a general rule,
[t]he exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful
search and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search. Beyond that, the
exclusionary rule also prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is
the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful
search.173
As the Court stated in Herring v. United States,174 “[t]o trigger
the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”175 This
170

Id. at 15.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. “The Court has limited the scope of the rule to ‘areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’ ” Alan Copelin, A Time to Act:
Statutory Exceptions to State-Created Exclusionary Rules, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339, 344
(1993) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). “Consequently, the
rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings, in civil actions, for witness impeachment in
criminal trials, or to challenge a state conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding when
the state provided ‘an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment
claims.’ ” Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)).
172
PETER J. HENNING & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 408 (4th
ed. 2012).
The exclusionary rule is best known in connection with the suppression
of evidence secured by an illegal search and seizure, [ ] it applies also to
statements made in connection with an illegal arrest, to confessions obtained involuntarily, during a period of unnecessary delay in bringing an
arrested person before a magistrate or at a time when the Miranda warnings have not been given, to identifications that are improperly made, and
to evidence obtained by illegal electronic surveillance.
Id.
173
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988).
174
555 U.S. 135 (2009).
175
Id. at 144.
171
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application of the exclusionary rule was further supported by Davis v.
United States,176 in which the Court stated that “[w]hen the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for
Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong
and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.”177 The Court further explained that “when the police act with an objectively reasonable
good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct
involves only simple isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale
loses much of its force and exclusion cannot pay its way.”178
It reasonably follows from the language of the Davis decision
that there exists, among others, a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon,179 the Court was asked to decide whether the exclusionary rule should apply to evidence obtained
pursuant to a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, but that
was subsequently found to be unsupportable by probable cause.180
After consideration of the exclusionary rule’s primary intended function, namely deterrence of unlawful police practices, the Court held
that a good-faith exception should apply to cases where police officers believed they were acting pursuant to a valid warrant and that the
evidence discovered as a result, even though otherwise unlawfully
obtained, should be admissible at trial as part of the prosecution’s
case in chief.181 The Court reasoned that where an officer relies on
the validity of a warrant, and that officer’s reliance is objectively reasonable, to exclude evidence obtained in accordance with the warrant, despite later finding it to be invalid, would not further the intended functions of the exclusionary rule and therefore should not be
grounds for suppression.182
While the good-faith exception applies to primary evidence,
meaning the evidence obtained as direct result of the police misconduct, federal courts recognize three additional exceptions to the ex176

131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
Id. at 2427 (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144).
178
Id. at 2427-28 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no justification for indiscriminately applying the exclusionary rule to all evidence obtained in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights as such an unwavering application “may well ‘generate disrespect for the law and administration of justice.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (quoting Stone, 428
U.S. at 491).
179
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
180
Id. at 900.
181
Id. at 913.
182
Id. at 919-20.
177
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clusionary rule, which largely apply only to secondary or derivative
evidence.183 Those exceptions are known as the independent source
doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, and attenuation.184
The attenuation exception allows for the introduction of derivative evidence where the causal link between the initial misconduct and the secondary evidence obtained becomes so distant that
“the taint of misconduct was dissipated to the point that the law
would not require exclusion.”185 “The point at which the taint becomes attenuated has been viewed as ‘the point of diminishing returns’ of the deterrence principle, at which point the detrimental consequences of the illegal police action no longer justify the cost of
exclusion.”186
The independent source doctrine, allows for the introduction
of secondary evidence, upon showing that the taint of the official
misconduct was not the direct cause of obtaining the secondary evidence. In other words, where secondary evidence “has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation,”
said evidence my still be admissible in a criminal prosecution. 187 As
the Court stated in the case of Wong Sun v. United States188
We need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to
light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather,
the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
taint.189
The rationale behind the independent source exception has been described as follows:
[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police
conduct and the public interest in having juries receive
183

Copelin, supra note 171, at 349.
Id.
185
Id. at 346.
186
Robert M. Bloom, Inevitable Discovery: An Exception Beyond the Fruits, 20 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 79, 90 (1992).
187
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984).
188
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
189
Id. at 487-88 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

25

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 12

1200

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not worse, position that they would have been if no police error or
misconduct had occurred. When then challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such
evidence would put the police in a worse position than
they would have been in absent any error or violation.190
Lastly, the inevitable discovery doctrine, established by the
Court in Nix v. Williams,191 allows for the introduction of evidence,
although otherwise unlawfully obtained, if that evidence would have
inevitably been discovered through some other lawful means.192
However, when the facts of the case, which dealt solely with admissibility of secondary evidence, are considered with the specific language of the Court’s opinion, and both the rationale and case law applied by the Court, the Nix decision has been interpreted as applying
the inevitable discovery doctrine only to derivative evidence.193
Since Nix remains the sole Supreme Court decision dealing directly
with this exclusionary rule exception in the context of secondary evidence, one must look to the lower federal courts for additional guidance in this area.194
Although the Court’s limited application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to secondary evidence has found support in some of
the lower federal courts, like for example, by the D.C. Circuit in case
of United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Currency.195 In that case, the
court refused to extend the exception to primary evidence, which the
government argued would have inevitably been discovered, despite
the unconstitutional search because of a preexisting inventory search
procedure.196 However, unlike the D.C. Circuit, to date, “[m]ost of
the circuits have utilized the inevitable discovery exception to allow
the introduction of primary evidence.”197 The Second Circuit, for example, does not distinguish primary evidence from secondary evi190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Nix, 467 U.S. at 443.
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
Copelin, supra note 171, at 347.
Bloom, supra note 186, at 90.
Id.
955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Bloom, supra note 186, at 90-91.
Id. at 87.
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dence when applying the inevitable discovery doctrine.198 In the case
of United States v. Pimentel,199 the Second Circuit, expressly rejected
the distinction between primary and derivative evidence and purposefully “characterized inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary rule, rather than an exception to the fruits of the poisonous
tree doctrine.”200
VI.

NEW YORK STATE
A.

Search and Seizure and the Warrant Requirement

The Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
search and seizure were first incorporated by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, and therefore, made applicable to
states in the case of Wolf v. Colorado.201 In Wolf, while the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states, it refused to likewise incorporate the exclusionary rule.202 However, Wolf
was subsequently overturned by Mapp, in which the Court established that both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule apply to the states.203 The rights created by the federal constitution represent the minima of rights that every state must uphold; yet, inherent
in a state’s police power is the authority for it to afford greater protections than those afforded under the federal constitution.
The language of Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State
Constitution is identical to that of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.204 In turn, New York courts recognize
that the respective constitutions confer similar, albeit not identical,
search and seizure rights on individuals.205 Furthermore, the New
York Court of Appeals “has not hesitated to expand the rights of New
York citizens beyond those required by the Federal Constitution” often affording greater search and seizure protections than those afford-

198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 87 n.46.
810 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1987).
Bloom, supra note 186, at 87 n.46.
338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
Id. at 33.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
Robinson, 767 N.E.2d at 642.
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ed under the Fourth Amendment.206
When analyzing the constitutionality of a challenged search or
seizure, the first question a court must answer is whether there was in
fact a search or seizure of an individual’s person or property. If there
was, then the second question is whether the search or seizure was
conducted in a manner that was reasonable under the circumstances.
New York courts are generally in agreement with federal courts as to
what actions constitute a search or seizure.207 With respect to intrusions into a persons’ body, the Court of Appeals has recognized that
taking a blood or saliva sample for DNA analysis is a search under
both the federal and state constitution.208 “It is beyond cavil that an
individual has a legitimate privacy expectation with respect to the
blood flowing through his or her own veins, and a corresponding
right to be free from the unreasonable search and seizure of such bodily fluids.”209
With respect to what is considered a search, the major difference between the federal and New York approaches is that New York
law, unlike federal law, considers discriminate and nonintrusive investigative methods, which reveal only evidence of criminality to be
search.210 As the court stated in People v. Dunn,211 “[u]nlike the Supreme Court, we believe that the fact that a given investigative procedure can disclose only evidence of criminality should have little
bearing on whether it constitutes a search.”212 The court further explained, “[n]ot withstanding such a method’s discriminate and nonintrusive nature, it remains a way of detecting the contents of a private place.”213 Therefore, under New York law, wherever there is an
intrusion by the government into an area carrying with it a reasonable
expectation of privacy, a search occurs regardless of whether the investigative methods used are largely nonintrusive.214
With respect to the seizure of a person, under federal law, a
206

Id.
People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990). A search occurs when the government intrudes on an area which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Id. at 1058.
208
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
209
People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997).
210
Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.
211
564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990).
212
Id. at 1057.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 1058.
207
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seizure occurs when a person is either physically restrained or otherwise submits to a show of authority.215 However, “for reasons peculiar to New York” a seizure of a person does not require an actual
submission to a show of authority, but instead, “[t]he test is whether a
reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that
the officer’s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her freedom.”216 Under both the federal and state constitution, a seizure of
property occurs when the government interferes with an individual’s
recognized property interest.217
It is a well established that any search or seizure conducted
absent a warrant properly issued by a neutral magistrate based upon a
finding of probable cause is presumptively unreasonable.218 New
York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYCPL”) authorizes a criminal
court to issue a search warrant “upon application of a police officer, a
district attorney, or other public servant acting in the course of his official duties.”219 The NYCPL defines a search warrant, in pertinent
part, as
a court order and process directing a police officer to
conduct [ ]a search of designated premises, or of a
designated vehicle, or of a designated person, for the
purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of
property, and to deliver any property so obtained to
the court which issued the warrant.220
In New York, probable cause to issue a warrant requires, based on the
totality of the circumstances, sufficient information “to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed or that
evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place.”221 It does not,
however, “require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.”222
When a search is conducted pursuant to valid warrant, under
the NYCPL, a individual’s personal property may then be subject to
seizure “if there is reasonable cause to believe that it . . . [c]onstitutes
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

People v. Bora, 634 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1994).
Id.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.05(2)-(2)(a) (McKinney 1999).
People v. Hodge, 378 N.E.2d 99, 101 (N.Y. 1978).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.05(1) (McKinney 1999).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.05(2)-(2)(a) (McKinney 1999).
People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1985).
Id.
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evidence or tends to demonstrate that an offense was committed . . .
or that a particular person participated in the commission of an offense.”223 The New York Court of Appeals has recognized that taking blood samples constitutes personal property within the confines
of the NYCPL, and therefore, can be seized pursuant to a valid court
order.224
Under search and seizure law, the issue of obtaining a DNA
sample from an individual is two-fold in that is requires both the
“seizure of the person [ ] to bring him into contact with government
agents” and then “the subsequent search for and seizure of the evidence.”225 These two issues must be considered separately.226 With
respect to the initial “ ‘detention’–and thus the ‘seizure’–of an individual to obtain physical evidence,” New York courts, in accord with
the Supreme Court, absent exigent circumstances require a “judicial
determination of probable cause . . . prior to the seizure.”227 As the
Court stated in the Matter of Abe A.,228 “when the physical evidence
whose possession is the raison d’etre for detaining a person cannot
be altered or destroyed, as in the case of the type of blood integral to
one’s body, by definition there can be no exigency to justify exemption from the warrant standard of probable cause.”229
Once an individual is detained for the purpose of taking a
DNA sample, the conditions under which the sample is taken must
comport with the individual’s constitutional rights.230 Protections
against unwarranted bodily intrusion are of the highest importance
under search and seizure law, and therefore, require a court find more
than just the basic threshold requirements of other areas of search and
seizure law.231 A valid court order to obtain a DNA or other similar
bodily sample requires a showing that there is “(1) probable cause to
believe the suspect has committed the crime, (2) a ‘clear indication’

223

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 690.10(4) (McKinney 1999).
In re Abe A., 437 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1982).
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 269. The court in the Matter of Abe A. noted that there are several states which
require a lesser showing than that of probable cause to authorize seizures for the purpose of
obtaining physical evidence, however, New York courts maintain that probable cause is the
proper standard in such cases. Id.
228
437 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1982).
229
Id. at 269.
230
Id. at 270.
231
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
224
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that the relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) [that] the
method used to secure it is safe and reliable.”232 Further, “the issuing
court must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the
evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive
means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against the concern for the
suspect’s constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion on the
other.”233 “Only if this stringent standard is met . . . may the intrusion
be sustained.”234
Although the warrant requirement is the most basic aspect of
reasonableness that is not to say that all searches or seizures conducted absent a warrant are unreasonable. Under both federal and state
law, a search or seizure conducted absent a warrant may nevertheless
be deemed reasonable if it falls within one of the “categorical exceptions.”235 Among the “categorical exceptions” to the warrant requirement recognized by both New York and federal courts is a
search and seizure made incident to lawful arrest, the plain view doctrine, the automobile exception, consent, and exigent circumstances.236 In support of the justifications that underlie each of these categorical exceptions, the Court of Appeals in People v. Singleteary237
observed that the “law of search and seizure has not become so recondite that it condemns necessarily prompt reasonable conduct in
effecting the interests of public safety in crimes involving murder, assaults, deadly weapons, and the like.”238 Thus, when obtaining a warrant would cause “inexcusable delay in an immediate and urgent investigation”, especially with respect to violent crimes, which in effect
could frustrate the apprehension of the person or persons who committed the crime, there is reasonable justification for dispensing the
warrant requirement.239

232
Id. Requiring a “ ‘clear indication’ that the intrusion will supply substantial probative
evidence . . . insur[es] that the evidence expected to be found is of importance, [and thereby]
guards against a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” In re Abe A., 437 N.E.2d at 270. In addition, “the
method by which the authorized intrusion is to be accomplished must be safe, reliable and
impose no more physical discomfort than is reasonably necessary.” Id.
233
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
234
Id.
235
People v. Singleteary, 324 N.E.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. 1974).
236
Id.
237
324 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1974).
238
Id. at 106.
239
Id.
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Excessive Force Claims

New York courts closely follow federal law with respect to
excessive force claims. Excessive force claims made by an individual occurring “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop of other
prearraignment seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
and its’ standard of objective reasonableness.”240 When deciding
whether the degree of force exerted was reasonable at this stage, it is
relevant to consider the State Police Guidelines governing the permissible measure of force that may be used to restrain an individual.241 The State Police Guidelines dictate six steps; “namely, the
physical presence of an officer, employment of a verbal command,
placement of a hand on the arrestee, the use of pepper spray, the use
of physical force and the use of deadly physical force.”242 In the case
of Passino v. State,243 the Court of Appeals held that the use of pepper spray to restrain an arrestee who refused to be handcuffed and
exhibited belligerent behavior was reasonable because the police
properly complied with the first three levels of the police guidelines
before resorting to the use of pepper spray.244
C.

The Exclusionary Rule

As previously discussed, although originally only applicable
in federal court, the Supreme Court in Mapp determined that the exclusionary rule was incorporated and made applicable to the states by
way of the Fourteenth Amendment.245 To reiterate, the exclusionary
rule is a judicially created remedy allowing for the suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, whether it is a direct or indirect
product of the government action, which was adopted to safeguard
individuals’ constitutional rights and deter unlawful police conduct.246 While “[t]he exclusionary rule ‘was originally created to de-

240

Passino v. State, 689 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999).
Id.
242
Id.
243
689 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999).
244
Id. at 259.
245
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
246
People v. Pleasant, 430 N.Y.S.2d 592, 593 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980). This judicially
created mechanism to secure individual rights was ultimately “[f]ormulated as a pragmatic
response to law enforcement procedures violative of individual liberties.” People v.
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. 1978).
241

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/12

32

Laterza: Unwanted Bodily Intrusion

2013]

UNWANTED BODILY INTRUSION

1207

ter police unlawfulness by removing the incentive’ to disregard the
law, [it] also ‘serves to insure that the State itself, and not just its police officers, respect the constitutional rights of the accused’ ”247 Ultimately, this rule provides a mechanism to secure and uphold individual rights as it was “[f]ormulated as a pragmatic response to law
enforcement procedures violative of individual liberties.”248
Application of the exclusionary rule is not itself a fundamental right.249 Again, as with the federal application of the rule, unconstitutionally obtained evidence, may be excluded, however its application “is not without limitations,” and thus, is not automatic.250
Because the primary justification for the exclusionary rule is its intended deterrent effect, so “[w]hether the rule should apply ‘depends
upon a balancing of its probable deterrent effect against its detrimental impact upon the truth finding process.’ ”251 In applying this
balancing test, where the remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule
are only tenuously demonstrated, a court might rule to uphold the
challenged evidence notwithstanding the unconstitutional means with
which it was obtained.252
In agreement with the federal approach, New York courts
recognize numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule. For instance, New York courts allow the prosecution to rely upon unconstitutionally obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings, to impeachment a defendant who takes the stand at trial, or in connection with “a
witness’ in-court identification.”253 Further, similar to the federal approach, with respect to secondary evidence, New York courts observe
the independent source,254 attenuation,255 and inevitable discovery256
exceptions. With respect to these three exceptions, however, New
York courts take a slightly different approach than federal courts by
limiting the application of these doctrines to secondary evidence even
247
People v. Jones, 810 N.E.2d 415, 419 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting People v. Payton, 412
N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (N.Y. 1980)).
248
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544.
249
Jones, 810 N.E.2d at 420.
250
Pleasant, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 593. “[T]he exclusionary rule has never enjoyed the stature
of an end in itself, but, rather, has served solely as a means to an end: a remedial device operating essentially upon a principle of deterrence.” McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544.
251
Jones, 810 N.E.2d at 420 (quoting McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544).
252
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d at 544.
253
Pleasant, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
254
People v. Binns, 749 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2002).
255
People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. 1987).
256
People v. Turriago, 681 N.E.2d 350, 356 (N.Y. 1997).
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in cases where the prosecution can show that the primary evidence
would most likely have been discovered notwithstanding its unlawful
procurement.257
Another difference with respect to exclusionary rule exceptions is that unlike federal courts, New York courts do not recognize
the Leon good-faith exception.258 In the case of People v. Bigelow,259
the police conducted a search of an automobile pursuant to what they
believed was a valid warrant issued by a county court judge; however, subsequent to the search, the warrant was deemed invalid based
on insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.260
The People in Bigelow argued, based on the Leon decision, that the
evidence obtained as a result of the search should not be suppressed
because it was “seized in objective good-faith reliance on a warrant
mistakenly issued by the magistrate.”261 The Court of Appeals expressly rejected the Leon rationale that suppression of evidence obtained in good-faith reliance on a warrant would not serve the intended purpose of the exclusionary rule, specifically in deterring police
misconduct.262 In rejecting the People’s rationale, the court stated:
[w]hether or not the police acted in good faith [ ] the
Leon rule does not help the People’s position. That is
so because if the People are permitted to use the seized
evidence, the exclusionary rule’s purpose is completely frustrated, a premium is placed on the illegal police
action and a positive incentive is provided to others to
engage in similar lawless acts in the future.263
VII.

APPLICATION

In New York, before ordering an uncharged suspect to submit
to a DNA sample, a court must be convinced by a showing of “probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime, a ‘clear
indication’ that the relevant material evidence will be found, and

257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Id.
Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d at 458.
488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 457.
Id. at 457-58.
Id.
Id. at 458.
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[that] the method used to secure it is safe and reliable.”264 Moreover,
“the issuing court must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of
less intrusive means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against the concern for the suspect’s constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion on the other.”265
Upon application by the People in Smith, the lower court
found that the People satisfied these stringent requirements, and
therefore, provided sufficient justification for the court to issue an order to compel Smith to submit to a DNA sample in the form of a
buccal swab.266 Smith did not challenge that judicial determination
on appeal, thereby impliedly conceding that the issuance of the order
was valid.267 In fact, Smith even complied with that court order and
provided a DNA sample.268 It was after Smith lawfully complied
with the court order that the trouble began.
By no fault of his own and unbeknownst to Smith, the police
compromised the sample and were forced to request a second court
order.269 Without notice to Smith, the court granted the request and
issued a duplicate order, again to compel Smith to submit to a buccal
swab.270 Acting pursuant to the duplicate order the police picked up
Smith in order to take a second DNA sample.271 Although Smith did
not initially resist the police when they picked him up, once at the
station he refused to open his mouth and submit to the test. 272 While
seated on the floor in a holding room, handcuffed, and surrounded by
several officers, the police tased Smith’s bare skin to force his compliance.273 This entire exchange, starting the moment Smith was first
apprehended and ending the moment he was tased, lasted less than
twenty minutes.274 On appeal, the court held that the DNA evidence
obtained after Smith was tased required suppression on the grounds
that the sample was secured as a result of excessive force and in vio264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274

Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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lation of Smith’s procedural due process rights.275
It is fundamental under both federal and state law that all
searches and seizures carried out by the government be deemed reasonable in order to stand up in court. The most basic rule in this area
is that searches and seizures conducted without a warrant issued by a
neutral magistrate based on a finding of probable cause are presumptively unreasonable unless the circumstance falls within a well established and carefully delineated exception, i.e., consent, search incident to lawful arrest, and exigent circumstances.276
The
reasonableness of a search or seizure, whether conducted with or
without a warrant, turns on the presence of absence of probable
cause.277 While the search and seizure of Smith’s DNA evidence was
conducted without a valid warrant and the second order was provided
and executed in violation of his due process rights, it is clear that
there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to search
under the facts of this case.278 However, absent a valid warrant,
probable cause alone could save neither the search nor the seizure
from violating Smith’s constitutional rights.279 Yet, the court did not
carefully consider whether the facts warranted invocation of an exception to the warrant clause.
Under the consent exception, the People could have argued
that Smith consented to the initial seizure of his person because he
did not resist the police when they apprehended him to take the sample.280 Without explanation, Smith allowed the police to handcuff
and transport him to the station where he was detained. 281 However,
even if Smith consented to the seizure of his person and any reasonable search that followed from that seizure, Smith’s consent to search
was unequivocally revoked by his actions at the station, specifically
refusing to open his mouth.282

275

Id. at 375.
See supra notes 58-60, 78-79, 235-36.
277
See supra notes 61, 221.
278
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
279
Id. at 376-77.
280
Id. at 378.
281
Id. To momentarily enter the mind of Smith, it seems like a reasonable assumption
that he did not initially resist the officers when they first apprehended him because, knowing
he had already provided a DNA sample, it is likely he believed was being arrested for his
connection with the robbery crimes. While there is nothing in the present decision that expressly supports this assumption, it is a reasonable inference based on the facts of the case.
282
Id.
276
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With respect to the exigent circumstances exception, both
federal and New York state courts have recognized that there are situations in which the need to preserve evidence is time sensitive, and
thus, justifies a warrantless search.283 An example of when such time
sensitive circumstances are present is where the police must preserve
evidence of a suspect’s blood-alcohol level.284 However unlike blood
alcohol content, DNA evidence, by its very nature is unchanging,
which means it does not fall within the exigent circumstances exception to justify the warrantless intrusion into Smith’s body.285
The next exception to the warrant requirement worthy of consideration in this context was search incident to lawful arrest. The
application of this exception is a little trickier because Smith was not
technically placed under arrest before the sample was taken; however, there is no dispute that there was at a minimum, probable cause to
issue the search warrant for Smith’s DNA for his suspected connection with the unsolved robbery crimes.286 Nevertheless, Smith was
still classified as merely a detainee when the sample was taken, and
thus, the warrantless search of his body did not fall within this exception.
When considering reasonableness, whether carried out pursuant to a valid warrant or one of the categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement, the manner in which the search or seizure is conducted is relevant to a court’s assessment of its constitutionality. The
second court order in the Smith case, although invalid for due process
reasons, called for the DNA sample to be taken by a buccal swab
procedure, which is a minimally intrusive, if not one of the least intrusive means of obtaining a DNA sample.287 However, the constitutional predicament arose because Smith was forcibly tased by the police as a method used to obtain Smith’s compliance with the order
and submission to what would otherwise have been viewed as a minimally intrusive procedure.288
Excessive force claims are judged by reference to the legal
status of the individual alleging the violation.289 Claims of free citi283
284
285
286
287
288
289

See supra notes 86, 239.
See supra note 92.
See supra notes 93, 229.
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 115.
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zens are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard, while claims of arrestees, and pretrial detainees are
analyzed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process
clauses applying the four-factor Johnson test in order to determine if
the force used amounted to punishment.290 The difficulty in applying
these tests is that the courts are not clear on where the detention of a
free citizen ends and where pretrial detention begins.291 Nevertheless, this distinction is carries importance, as the Fourth Amendment
standard provides greater protection to an individual’s privacy and
security rights than afforded by either the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment.292
In the present case, Smith was a suspect who was detained to
effectuate his compliance with a court order.293 Based on that fact,
Smith was still a free citizen, which means that his excessive force
claim required analysis under the Fourth Amendment, using its objective reasonableness standard.294 However, it is arguable that at some
point during his detention, prior to the police’s use of the taser,
Smith’s status transformed into that of an arrestee. Nevertheless, under the Fourth Amendment standard, the use of the taser on Smith
who was handcuffed and detained at the police station, and thus, not
at risk of flight and presented no immediate threat to the police, was
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.295 Smith did not
become violent or aggressive, bur rather, merely refused to open his
mouth.296 Moreover, there were no other exigencies to justify the
immediate need for the police to obtain the sample.297 As previously
discussed, DNA evidence by nature is unchanging, which created a
challenge for the officers to argue any justification for resorting to
use of a taser on Smith.298 The police engaged in such conduct just to
obtain a sample that would have yielded precisely the same evidentiary results had they exhausted more reasonable methods first. As
such, the Appellate Division properly found the use of the taser in

290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

See supra notes 131-36, 141.
See supra notes 121-23.
See supra notes 131-50.
Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
Id. at 376-78.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 93, 229, 285.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/12

38

Laterza: Unwanted Bodily Intrusion

2013]

UNWANTED BODILY INTRUSION

1213

this case amounted to a constitutional violation.299
When evidence is obtained in violation of an individual’s
constitutional rights, one remedy is to suppress the evidence at trial.300 Because the purpose of this exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police practices, where suppression would not serve its greater societal function, evidence obtained both as a direct and/or indirect
result of the violation may still be introduced under certain circumstances.301 These exceptions to the exclusionary rule include, inevitable discovery, attenuation, independent source, and good-faith reliance on an invalid warrant.302
Addressing the good faith exception first, federal courts may
allow the introduction of evidence at trial, both primary and derivate,
where a search or seizure was carried out by police officers in an objective good-faith reliance on a warrant, even when that warrant is
later found invalid.303 The idea is that the deterrent effect of the suppressing evidence obtained as result of unlawful police practices is
not served when the police act in accordance with what they believe
to be a valid warrant.304 New York courts on the other hand, refuse to
recognize this exception arguing that allowing the introduction of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, even if the police claim to have
been acting in good faith, frustrates the purpose of the exclusionary
rule and in effect could work as an incentive for future lawless action.305 Accordingly, had Smith been decided under federal law, because the police took the sample in good-faith reliance on the validity
of the second court order, even though the sample was the primary
evidence obtained as a result of the constitutional violation, the DNA
evidence may have been admissible at trial as part of the government’s case in chief. However, under New York law, had Smith
raised this issue on appeal, regardless of whether or not the police
acted in good-faith reliance on the validity of the second court order,
Smith’s DNA evidence would likely have been suppressed.
With respect to the independent source, attenuation, and inevitable discovery exceptions, as a general rule these only apply to
299
300
301
302
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304
305

Smith, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78.
See supra notes 245-48.
See supra notes 171-75, 249-56.
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See supra notes 258-63.
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the admission of evidence obtained secondary to the constitutional
violation.306 In Smith, neither the independent source nor the attenuation exceptions are relevant under the facts presented; however, the
inevitable discovery exception raises some interesting issues.
The inevitable discovery exception allows for the introduction
of otherwise unconstitutionally obtained evidence at trial if through
some other police practice, the challenged evidence would have inevitably been discovered.307 To date, the Supreme Court has only dealt
with the inevitable discovery exception in the context of secondary
evidence, and therefore, the precedent is limited and the question of
whether it applies to primary evidence remains open to state court’s
discretion.308 However, most of the lower federal courts, including
for example the Second Circuit, have extended the inevitable discovery exception to apply both to the introduction of primary and secondary evidence.309 Despite this expansive interpretation by lower
federal courts, New York courts refuse to extend application of the
inevitable discovery exception beyond that of secondary evidence.310
In Smith, the court issued not one, but two orders compelling
Smith to submit to a DNA test.311 Interestingly, Smith complied with
the first order but the police compromised the sample.312 Thereafter,
when Smith refused to submit to the second order the police forced
his compliance by way of a taser gun.313 The DNA evidence would
therefore constitute primary evidence since it was obtained as a direct
result of the constitutional violation. If analyzed under federal law, a
majority of the lower federal courts would likely find that the DNA
evidence admissible at trial. Not only did the court issue two orders
prior to the violation, but those orders were supported by probable
cause.314 Furthermore, had the police exhausted other options to
force Smith to comply with the order, such as holding him in contempt, the police would have inevitably obtained the DNA evidence.
However, in a minority of federal courts and under New York law,
the inevitable discovery exception would not apply because Smith’s
306
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309
310
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313
314

See supra notes 185-94, 253-55.
See supra notes 191-92.
See supra notes 191-94.
See supra notes 193-94.
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DNA sample was primary evidence, thus requiring suppression at trial to remedy the constitutional violation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The New York State Constitution generally provides individuals with greater search and seizure rights than those afforded under
the United States Constitution. When evidence is obtained in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights, under New York law,
courts are more likely to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence at trial than federal courts. Interestingly, despite the fact that
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government, particularly in the area of forced bodily intrusions, is
one of the most fundamental rights of for individuals, the federal interpretation of the exclusionary rule, in many instances, may leave an
individual without remedy for constitutional violations in this area.
New York State’s interpretation of the exclusionary rule is more protective of individuals’ rights, and therefore, the protections afforded
to individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures would best
be served if all courts followed New York’s more protective interpretation.
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